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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 12-2961
___________
JAMES T. COLE, JR.,
Appellant
v.
SETH FERRANTI; GORILLA CONVICT PUBLISHING
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil Action No. 4-10-cv-00426)
District Judge: Honorable John E. Jones III
____________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
August 21, 2013
Before: SMITH, CHAGARES and SHWARTZ, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: August 26, 2013)
___________
OPINION
___________
PER CURIAM
James Cole, a federal inmate proceeding pro so, appeals from an order of the United
States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania, which granted summary
judgment to defendants Seth Ferranti and Gorilla Convict Publications. We will affirm the
District Court’s order.
1

In 2010, Cole filed a pro se complaint in the District Court, alleging that he was libeled
and slandered in a book entitled Street Legends that was written by Ferranti and published by
Gorilla Convict Publications in 2008. According to Cole, Street Legends
included false and defamatory statements about his past involvement with a criminal
organization known as the Junior Black Mafia. Defendant Ferranti, also a pro se federal
inmate, filed a motion for summary judgment on behalf of himself and Gorilla Convict
Publications on the grounds that Cole’s complaint was barred by the one-year statute of
limitations applicable to defamation actions in Pennsylvania. The District Court concluded
that Cole’s complaint was time-barred and granted summary judgment to both Ferranti and
Gorilla Convict. Cole timely filed this appeal.
We exercise jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review the order granting
summary judgment de novo, using the same standard as the District Court. See Pichler v.
UNITE, 542 F.3d 380, 385 (3d Cir. 2008). Summary judgment is appropriate when the
movant demonstrates “that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
Pennsylvania law imposes a one-year statute of limitations on claims for defamation.
42 Pa. C. S. § 5523(1). Cole initiated his suit in February 2010. He does not dispute the
District Court’s finding that Street Legends was published almost two years earlier, in April
2008, but argues that he is entitled to tolling under Pennsylvania’s “discovery rule” because he
did not learn of the book’s publication until June 2009. The District Court concluded that Cole
cannot benefit from the discovery rule because the rule does not apply to claims alleging
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defamation through mass-media publications like Street Legends. On appeal, Cole emphasizes
that neither this Court nor the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has decided whether the discovery
rule applies to mass-media defamation actions, and that his incarceration served as a barrier to
timely discovering his injury because inmates do not have ready access to new books,
magazines, or the internet.
The Pennsylvania discovery rule “toll[s] the statute of limitations in any case where a
party neither knows nor reasonably should have known of his injury and its cause at the time
his right to institute suit arises.” Fine v. Checcio, 870 A.2d 850, 859 (Pa. 2005). Under the
rule, the limitations period begins to run when the complaining party “knows, or reasonably
should know, (1) that he has been injured, and (2) that his injury has been caused by another
party’s conduct.” Bohus v. Beloff, 950 F.2d 919, 924 (3d Cir. 1991). Because we apply
Pennsylvania’s statute of limitations and tolling principles in this diversity action, we must
look to Pennsylvania law and predict how the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would view the
applicability of the discovery rule to Cole’s case. Id. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has
explained that the discovery rule’s central purpose is to address “an injury that is not
immediately ascertainable.” Fine, 870 A.2d at 859-60. The Court has cautioned that the rule
“cannot be applied so loosely as to nullify the purpose for which a statute of limitations exists,”
and is reserved for “worthy cases” in which “the injured party is reasonably unaware that an
injury has been sustained.” Dalrymple v. Brown, 701 A.2d 164, 167 (Pa. 1997). Under
Pennsylvania law, incarceration generally is not a basis for tolling. See 42 Pa. C. S. § 5533(a).
We do not decide whether Pennsylvania’s discovery rule broadly operates in the context
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of mass-media defamation claims because we conclude that in this case Cole could not have
been “reasonably unaware that an injury has been sustained” during the limitations period.
Dalrymple, 701 A.2d at 167.1 Cole acknowledges that he received a letter from Ferranti in
2007 asking if he would be willing to add anything to a book Ferranti was writing called Street
Legends, which included passages about Cole’s affiliation with the Junior Black Mafia. Cole
asserts that he replied by letter to Ferranti stating that he did not want his name to be included
in the book, and thereafter assumed that the matter was resolved. It was not until June 2009,
Cole maintains, that he learned about the publication of Street Legends when he was told by
fellow inmates that a book which made unflattering references to him was circulating among
the inmate population. According to Cole, he did not decide to read the book until six months
later, in December 2009, and did not file his complaint in the District Court for another two
months.
Cole had advance notice of the book’s imminent publication before the one-year
limitations period on defamation claims began to run. Although his incarceration may have
required him to exercise more diligence in discovering that Street Legends was published
before the limitations period expired in April 2009, there is no evidence to suggest that Cole
acted in a reasonable manner to preserve his rights after corresponding with Ferranti. On the
contrary, he admits that after informing Ferranti that he did not wish to be in the book, he
1

We note that the Seventh Circuit has declined to apply the discovery rule in a mass-media
defamation action brought by an incarcerated inmate. See Schweihs v. Burdick, 96 F.3d 917,
921 (7th Cir. 1996). State courts have reached similar conclusions in mass-media defamation
cases involving non-incarcerated plaintiffs. See, e.g., Shively v. Bozanich, 31 80 P.3d 676,
688-89 (Cal. 2003); Mullin v. Washington Free Weekly, Inc., 785 A.2d 296, 299 (D.C. 2001);
Flynn v. Assoc'd Press, 519 N.E.2d 1304, 1307 (Mass. 1988); Clark v. AiResearch Mfg. Co. of
Ariz. Inc., 673 P.2d 984, 986-87 (Ariz. 1983).
4

assumed the matter was over. Cole did not act to preserve his rights even after learning that
Street Legends was circulating in his prison, waiting until December 2010 to obtain a copy and
read it. Under these circumstances, we cannot conclude that application of Pennsylvania’s
equitable discovery rule is appropriate. 2
Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court’s order.3

2

We reject Cole’s alternative argument that a second printing of Street Legends in April 2010
caused the one-year statute of limitations period for his defamation claims to begin anew. See
In re Phila. Newspapers, LLC, 690 F.3d 161, 174 (3d Cir. 2012).
3
Cole asks us to remand to the District Court with respect to the grant of Ferranti’s motion for
summary judgment on behalf of Gorilla Convict Publications. We agree that as a non-attorney,
Ferranti was not permitted to represent Gorilla Convict, apparently a sole proprietorship owned
by a third-party, in the summary judgment motion. See Iannaccone v. Law, 142 F.3d 553, 558
(2d Cir. 1998). We will deny Cole’s request to remand on that basis, however, because the
District Court acknowledged that Ferranti was not allowed to represent Gorilla Convict and
was permitted to grant summary judgment to Gorilla Convict independent of Ferranti’s motion.
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(f); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 326 (1986) (“district courts
are widely acknowledged to possess the power to enter summary judgments sua sponte, so
long as the losing party was on notice that she had to come forward with all of her evidence.”).
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